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ABSTRACT 
The Conservative Peoples’ Party of Estonia (EKRE) presents a unique case in the study of 
far-right parties for two reasons. First, the ‘others’ to which they juxtapose Estonians are 
the Russian-speaking minority, who are white, historically Christian, and to a large extent, 
share many of the socially conservative values of EKRE. Second, there has been a trend for 
European far-right parties to look towards the Russian Federation for ideological support 
due to shared socially conservative ideological positions, and an opposition to the EU and 
NATO. EKRE takes a different stance towards the Russian Federation than many other far-
right parties in Europe. Interviews were conducted with members of EKRE, as well as 
members of other political parties in Estonia, primarily focusing on the post-migrant crisis 
relationship between EKRE and the Russian-speaking population in Estonia, as well as 
other core issues related to EKRE. The aim of this article is twofold: first, it serves as an 
introductory piece, introducing EKRE to the broader literature on populist, radical right 
parties. Secondly, this article asks the questions “is the presence, or the possibility of the 
presence of a foreign, racially and religiously different ‘other’ enough to attract a 
significant portion of a national minority to vote for and become members of a PRR party?” 
and “is the presence, or the possibility of the presence of a foreign, racially and religiously 
different ‘other’ enough to entice a PRR party to cooperate with a national minority which 
was previously their target?” This article argues that EKRE is open to Russian-speakers 
becoming party members, but will not extend their reach to them as Russian-speakers. 
Rather, they would welcome Russian-speakers as party members provided they are 
Estonian nationalists who adhere to the party constitution and see Estonia as a sovereign 
nation which they seek to protect. 
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INTRODUCTION  
This article is one of the first to present an English language analysis of the 
Estonian party, Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (Conservative People’s Party of 
Estonia – henceforth, EKRE) in light of their election to the Estonian Parliament in 
2015. EKRE presents a unique case study for nationalist and populist radical right 
political (PRR) parties for two reasons. First, the “other” to which they have initially 
juxtaposed ethnic Estonians is the Russian-speaking minority, who are white, 
historically Christian and, to a large extent, share many of the socially conservative 
values of the EKRE. Second, there has been a trend within the PRR to establish 
relationships with the Russian Federation due to shared socially conservative 
ideological positions, and a critical approach, to the EU and NATO. While EKRE can 
be placed within the same party family as many PRR parties, they take an 
unfavourable stance towards the Russian Federation. The purpose of this article is 
twofold: first, it contributes to thus far limited English language academic 
scholarship on EKRE after they entered the Estonian parliament in 2015. Secondly, 
this article aims to analyse the potentially changing relationship between EKRE 
and Estonia’s Russian-speaking community in light of the refugee crisis.  
This article provides an analysis of EKRE by analysing interviews conducted 
with party members, as well as members of other Estonian parties who provide 
useful commentary. The interviews analyse EKRE’s views towards the European 
Union after the migrant crisis, the party’s potentially changing relationship with 
the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and their stance towards the Russian 
Federation. Using a qualitative, inductive approach, this article poses two questions. 
First, “is the presence, or the possibility of the presence of a foreign, racially and 
religiously different “other” enough to attract a significant portion of a national 
minority to vote for and become members of a PRR party?” Second, “is the 
presence, or the possibility of the presence of a foreign, racially and religiously 
different “other” enough to entice a PRR party to cooperate with a national 
minority which was previously their target?”  
 This article argues both that EKRE is open to Russian-speakers becoming active 
members of the party, but will not extend their reach to them as Russian speakers, 
rather as Estonian nationalists and, secondly, that more Russian-speaking Estonians 
have shown an interest in becoming involved in EKRE. Both of which are a direct 
result of the refugee crisis. Prior to this development, EKRE has taken a staunch anti-
Russian stance and in some ways still does. Further, Russian-speakers in Estonia 
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overwhelmingly support Eesti Keskerakond (Estonian Centre Party – henceforth, 
the Centre Party).  
 
 
Background of EKRE  
Estonia is new to the almost unanimous list of European countries with a PRR party 
represented in Parliament. For many years, Estonia lacked a successful right-wing, 
nationalist party (Auers and Kasekamp 2015). One of the primary reasons for the 
lack of a successful far-right party was the absence of a prominent and charismatic 
leader (Auers and Kasekamp 2013). This aspect is no longer missing. Father and 
son, Mart and Martin Helme, successfully moulded EKRE out of a merger between 
Eestimaa Rahvaliit (the People’s Union of Estonia) and Eesti Rahvuslik Liikumine 
(The Estonian National Movement) in 2012. This merger was a marriage of a 
political party and a social movement.  
Aside from the Russian-speaking population, there are relatively few ethnically 
different inhabitants in Estonia. Therefore, memory politics has been, up until 
now, the primary agent for the Estonian far-right in the 21st century (Auers and 
Kasekamp 2013) and the Russian-speaking population has been the group to 
which Estonian nationalists have identified themselves against. EKRE first gained 
parliamentary representation in 2015, securing seven, out of a possible 101, seats 
in the Estonian Parliament. This is relatively late considering that all of Estonia’s 
neighbours have a successful PRR party. There have been several attempts to 
label and categorise parties who are nationalist, conservative, opposed to 
immigration and hold a critical, if not hostile, view towards the European Union. 
The common aspect that unites these parties is maintaining a nativist stance by 
combining nationalist and xenophobic attitudes (De Lange and Mügge 2015; 
Harteveld et al 2015; Mudde 2007). Cas Mudde (2007) coined the authoritative term 
in academic literature, populist radical right (PRR), to label parties in this family. 
This article will define a PRR party as a party that takes a strong nativist stance, 
vocalising an exclusionary attitude towards immigration and multiculturalism, as 
well as utilising the tactic of juxtaposing political elites to everyone else in an 
attempt to appeal to whom they deem as ‘ordinary citizens’. Using Mudde’s (2007) 
categorisation, this article firmly places EKRE within this party family.  
Auers and Kasekamp (2013) note, that there is a distinct brand of right-wing 
politics in post-Soviet Baltic States, which directs nativism towards the Russian-
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speaking population who arrived during the Soviet occupation (Auers and Kase-
kamp 2013). Bustokova and Kitschelt (2009) allude to a significant difference which 
sets the PRR in post-communist countries apart from the PRR in Western Europe, 
namely, that the “other” constitutes ethnic groups who have been inhabiting the 
region for centuries, even prior to the Soviet period. In the case of Estonia, this has 
not been centuries, but decades, as the Russian-speaking minority arrived during 
Soviet occupation.  
Further, Minkenberg (2002) makes two important and unique observations 
about the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe. First, that parties in these 
countries share similar characteristics which differentiate them from the PRR in 
Western Europe. Namely, that they are ideologically more extreme, more anti-
democratic and that they are more of a social movement phenomenon (Minken-
berg 2002 & 2013).1 Minkenberg indicates that the new radical right has softened 
its approach to anti-democratic rhetoric (ibid), yet it should be noted that EKRE 
does not espouse anti-democratic rhetoric. Second, Minkenberg (2002) recognises, 
that the PRR in Central and Eastern Europe is a fluid concept, constantly evolving 
and likens studying this phenomenon to shooting at a moving target with 
clouded vision (Minkenberg 2002). The PRR parties in Central and Eastern Europe 
to which EKRE has the most in common with is the Latvian National Alliance.2 
There has not been an anti-democratic attitude prevalent within EKRE and, 
although a grassroots mobilising force has played a part in the party’s history, there 
is no militant wing of the party similar to the Magyar Gàrda affiliated with Jobbik 
or the Slovak Brotherhood affiliated with Kotleba – People’s Party Our Slovakia.3  
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
1  Minkenberg (2002) notes an important difference between political parties and social move-
ments. Whereas parties participate in elections and try to win public office, social movements 
mobilise support, but do not run for public office. Instead, social movements identify with a 
network of networks which have a well-defined collective identity and offer interpretative frames 
for problems.  
2  It should be noted that the two parties which EKRE has the closest relationship with are the 
National Alliance and the True Finns, thus putting them in a sphere of influence between Nordic 
and Eastern Europe, another factor which makes them a unique case.  
3  Although the European-wide street patrol group Soldiers of Odin exists in Estonia, it is a separate 
organisation from EKRE. There is, however, some convergence as recently members of Soldiers of 
Odin marched alongside EKRE and other nationalist and far-right actors in the annual torchlight 
parade on Estonia’s Independence Day.  
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EKRE and Europe 
The presence of a pro-democratic ethos is particularly evident in the party’s stance 
regarding Swiss style direct democracy. This can be seen most adequately in their 
position on Estonia’s membership in the European Union. This can be seen most 
adequately in their position in Estonia’s membership in the European Union. 
Vasilopoulou (2009) points out that Euroscepticism is not a monolithic entity and 
identifies three types of Euroscepticism: rejecting, conditional, and compro-
mising. This article places EKRE between the conditional and rejecting categories 
of Euroscepticism. While being highly critical, EKRE does not directly advocate for 
Estonia leaving the EU. Rather, they would like to give the Estonian people a 
chance to decide their future in the EU. In April of 2017 at the party congress, where 
Chairman Mart Helme was re-elected by an overwhelming majority, the congress 
called on Estonian citizens to have a say on their country’s membership in the EU 
(Cavegn, 2017). Sovereignty is the primary issue that EKRE takes with the EU, 
especially when it comes to the migrant crisis, security issues, and the presence of 
non-Estonians in Estonia.4 The congress, in its call for the Estonian people to 
reassess EU membership, advocates for the preservation of ‘Estonianness’ and for 
the guarantee of well-being for Estonia’s indigenous population (Cavegn, 2017).  
In interviews with key EKRE members, it was stressed that the EU has changed 
since 2004 when Estonia joined. EKRE MP and deputy chairman of the European 
Union Affairs Committee, Jaak Madison, stated in an interview that the EU is one 
of the most undemocratic systems, citing penalties for not accepting EU 
mandates and rules.5 At the same time, Madison revealed that neither he, nor the 
party, had ever said that they wished to leave the EU; rather, that the migrant 
crisis and the reasons behind Brexit should be discussed more frequently in 
Estonia.6 What Madison did discuss is the issues behind why other countries have 
had parties that brought exiting the EU to the agenda. According to him, if the EU 
continues towards a path of creating a federation, citizens will be highly critical of 
this. Madison, while confirming that neither he nor EKRE wished for an Estonian 
                                                                                                                                       
4  Interview with Martin Helme and Interview with Jaak Madison.  
5  Interview with Jaak Madison.  
6  Ibid. 
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exit, stressed that if there was a Brexit style vote in Estonia, the main question 
would be the migration crisis to which the majority of Estonians are opposed to.7  
EKRE Deputy Chairman, Martin Helme, stressed the issue of sovereignty. 
According to Helme, a large part of Estonian society along with EKRE do not 
accept the quota system or the mandatory placement of migrants into Estonian 
society.8 Helme discussed the failure of both the EU and the Estonian government 
with regards to this issue. According to Helme, an EU external border does not 
exist and EKRE strongly advocates for restoring Estonian border control.9 Helme 
blames the Estonian government for entirely failing to represent and defend 
Estonian interests in Brussels and applauds Austria and the Visegrád countries for 
strongly defending their position and their borders against mandates from 
Brussels.10 It is this perceived failure which Helme feels has turned many Estonians 
against the EU.11  
 
 
A devil you don’t want to dance with 
Another aspect of EKRE that differentiates them from a number of parties within 
the PRR party family is their position towards the Russian Federation. Many PRR 
parties, agitated with the European Union, have turned their ideological gaze 
eastward. It has been a growing trend for European PRR parties to openly support 
Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Hungarian think tank, Political Capital 
Institute, has labelled three types of PRR parties vis-à-vis their stance towards the 
Russian Federation: committed, open/neutral, and hostile (Political Capital Institute, 
2014). Most PRR parties fall under the committed category, while some fall under 
open and neutral. The smallest category is hostile. Although they are not 
mentioned in this study, the author places the EKRE in the hostile category. EKRE 
has not shown any willingness to cooperate with or support Vladimir Putin and 
Russia. Martin Helme acknowledged that there has been some interest in the 
                                                                                                                                       
7  Interview with Jaak Madison. Though it was also mentioned in this interview that, although many 
in Estonia were critical or against Estonia accepting refugees, not all who held this view voted for 
EKRE.  
8  Interview with Martin Helme. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Ibid.  
11  Ibid.  
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Russian Federation shown by PRR parties in Western Europe and expressed that 
EKRE is “very, very mindful of the fact that there has been some naivety and 
cynicism on the part of western anti-immigrant parties toward Russia” and that he 
has explained to them that this is “a devil that you don’t want to dance with.”12 
Helme alludes to the fact that countries such as France and the Netherlands do 
not have the same historic experience with the Russian Federation as Estonia.13 
Helme believes the Russian Federation is manipulating the existential crisis 
that Europe is experiencing with mass migration to their benefit in an attempt to 
sow discord with the end goal of restoring the Russian Empire.14 If discourses 
from the majority of other PRR parties in Europe are analysed, this narrative is 
largely absent. There has been some speculation that EKRE has been covertly 
flirting with Russia and rumours about financing have been discussed.15 Martin 
Helme is aware of such rumours and mentioned that EKRE has been accused of 
doing Putin’s dirty work because indeed, there are several political positions 
which EKRE has in common with Vladimir Putin.16 Helme also mentioned that it is 
common knowledge that no one can present any evidence that EKRE has 
collaborated with the Russian Federation so people have “given up.”17 Given the 
political positions that EKRE has taken, which this paper will now turn to, along 
with the fact that they actively try to persuade other PRR parties not to align 
themselves with the Russian Federation18, there is no evidence that the party 
sympathises with Putin.  
 
 
Blue Awakening, Ethnofuturism and transnational alliances  
Ruuben Kaalep, chairman and founder of EKRE’s youth organisation, Sinine Äratus 
(Blue Awakening), advocates for a closer union between Baltic and Eastern Euro-
pean countries. Kaalep noted an increasing divide in ideology between Western 
                                                                                                                                       
12  Ibid. 
13  Ibid.  
14  Ibid. 
15  Interview with Valdo Randpere.  
16  Interview with Martin Helme.  
17  Ibid. 
18  Interviews with Ruuben Kaalep and Kert Urmas Raudvere.  
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and Eastern European countries and cited the migrant crisis as the primary 
indicator of such a phenomenon.19 As was pointed out by Minkenberg (2002 & 
2013), Auers and Kasekamp (2015), and Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009), the PRR in 
post-communist countries differ ideologically from their western counterparts. 
According to Kaalep, in Eastern Europe the presence of Soviet history has 
“vaccinated Eastern Europeans against leftist ideology.”20 The second issue that 
differentiates Eastern Europe, according to Kaalep, is that national identity is 
much more alive in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe.21 
Although a youth organisation, the ideology and discourse of Blue Awakening 
is especially important, because, as the future of the EKRE, their young members 
will likely be the next generation who hold elected office for this party. Blue 
Awakening is very active in recruiting members for EKRE, maintaining an online 
presence and fostering transnational connections with other nationalists. There-
fore, their ideas and positions should be taken into account in an assessment of 
the party. Fielitz and Laloire (2016) point out that the European far-right is currently 
undergoing a process of restructuring where new actors have appeared and 
successfully gained influence in the political sphere. These new actors draw on 
new forms of mobilisation and transnational networking, incorporating certain 
aspects which have been previously absent in the far right (Fielitz and Laloire, 
2016).  
Blue Awakening is a driving force behind the creation of new alliances amongst 
Eastern European nationalists. Ruuben Kaalep and fellow Blue Awakening 
member, Kert Urmas Raudvere discussed EKRE's close alignment with the youth 
wing of the Latvian National Alliance (NA). Overall, the NA is the closest party to 
which EKRE is allied in terms of collaboration and networks, but the party also has 
ties with the True Finns and the Freedom Party of Austria, two very successful PRR 
parties.22 Two fairly recent developments in the form of transnational networks 
are the Bauska Declaration and Intermarium.  
The former is part of a Baltic-wide alliance of nationalists, which align under 
their proclaimed Bauska Declaration.23 This consists of the Latvian National Alliance, 
                                                                                                                                       
19  Interview with Ruuben Kaalep.  
20  Ibid. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Interview with Jaak Madison. 
23  Bauska Deklaratsioon. https://ekre.ee/bauska-deklaratsioon/  
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the Lithuanian Nationalist Union, and EKRE. This alliance goes beyond the youth 
movements as the two EKRE signatories were party Chairman Mart Helme along 
with Ruuben Kaalep. The declaration calls for the maintaining of family values and 
the fatherland and cautions against an immigration policy like that of Western 
Europe.24 The declaration also calls for a new nationalist awakening and encourages 
cooperation between the three Baltic nations to defend against external threats 
and global challenges.25  
Further, Blue Awakening maintains very close alliances with Polish, Slovak, 
Ukrainian, Hungarian, and Swedish nationalists26 as well as the alt-right in the U.S. 
It is their goal to foster alliances with as many other nationalists as possible. Blue 
Awakening members Ruuben Kaalep and Kert Urmas Raudvere discussed a 
counterbalance to both Western European influence and Russian imperialist 
ambitions in the form of a large Eastern European nationalist block. Both cited an 
alternative to the Europe envisioned by Brussels in the form of an Eastern 
European block that would serve as an ideological alternative to the liberal values 
promoted by Brussels.27  
As several PRR parties view Vladimir Putin’s Russia as a nationalist and 
conservative alternative to what the Brussels elite have offered, the Intermarium 
strategy is part of a nationalist movement to provide an ideological substitute to 
both the EU and the tendency to look towards the Kremlin as a viable political 
alternative. Kert Urmas Raudvere stressed that this would not be against Western 
Europe per se, only ideologically different – more right-wing, more conservative 
and more nationalist.28  
Intermarium, named after the historical interwar plan, is a strategy promoted 
by the nationalist group, ‘The New Nationalism’, which ‘links the far right from the 
Baltic to the Black sea.’29 This network consists of nationalists mostly from youth 
organisations of PRR parties throughout Eastern Europe and Swedish nationalists.30 
                                                                                                                                       
24  Ibid.  
25  Ibid.  
26  Interview with Kert Urmas Raudvere.  
27  Interview with Ruuben Kaalep and Interview with Kert Urmas Raudvere.  
28  Interview with Kert Urmas Raudvere.  
29  The New Nationalism. http://thenewnationalism.com/  
30  It should be noted that the Swedish organisation that Blue Awakening has the most contact with 
is Nordisk Ungdom, a far-right, extra parliamentary group.  
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As the Visegrád countries have been somewhat defiant towards Brussels in light 
of the refugee crisis and the nationalist, far-right is empowered in all of these 
countries with the exception of the Czech Republic, this would be a notable 
political shift.31 While this is largely a youth movement, the likelihood of many of 
the youth members eventually holding elected office is quite probable. In Latvia, 
the National Alliance is in government and has become a normalised part of the 
Latvian political system. In Hungary, Jobbik is the third largest political party and 
Slovakia has two PRR parties in Parliament. EKRE does not wield as much power as 
the aforementioned parties, but is influential in both Estonian politics and the 
Intermarium ideology as one of the driving forces behind the project.  
The philosophy behind intermarium, known as ‘ethnofuturism’, is part of a new 
nationalist approach driven by Ruuben Kaalep and Raivis Zeltīts, the secretary 
general of the Latvian National Alliance and head of their youth organisation. 
Ethnofuturism is a nationalist doctrine intended to create a new European civili-
zation based upon identity and roots and led by Eastern Europe (London Forum, 
2017).32 The driving principle behind this is that Eastern Europe is caught between 
two major global spheres of interest: The U.S. and the Russian Federation (ibid). 
The concept of ethnofuturism is based on identities and stands against imperialism 
which is seen as a force detrimental to identity based nationalism.  
Bringing about the destruction of both American and Russian imperialism and 
replacing them with white ethnostates is a goal of ethnofuturism (Red Ice TV, 
2017).33 This philosophy stresses cooperation between nationalists. However, 
given the historic and contemporary experiences of the nationalities in the region, 
getting nationalists from diverse Eastern European backgrounds to cooperate 
with each other could prove to be challenging. Kaalep emphasises that the mission 
of all European nationalists should be to cooperate to save Europe; once this is 
achieved nationalists can return to fighting each other.34 However, once Europe is 
                                                                                                                                       
31  Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland is by most accounts, a right-wing, national-conservative party. 
However, after they came to power in 2015, during the heat of the refugee crisis, I consider PiS to 
be a radical right actor. See, “The Polish Boomerang: How Warsaw’s Adaption of the ‘Budapest 
Model’ Could Threaten the Original in Hungary.” By Cas Mudde, 2016.  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/cas-mudde/the-polish-boomerang-how-_b_8961896.html.  
32  London Forum: Ruuben Kaalep – “The Principles of Ethnofuturism.”  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JMcAsYsioqA  
33  Red Ice TV: Ruuben Kaalep – Blue Awakening: Estonian Nationalism – Identitarian Ideas IX.  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0AkqRUpoO20  
34  Ruuben Kaalep: “The Principles of Ethnofuturism.”  
13 
‘saved’, perhaps there will be no need for further fighting amongst European 
nationalists (ibid).  
So far, this has been successful. On 24 February 2017, commemorating Estonian 
Independence, EKRE hosted the fourth annual torchlight parade. Attendance for 
this event has gone from 120 people to 3500 (Red Ice TV, 2017). Not all in atten-
dance were Estonian. Polish, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian nationalists – old enemies, 
were brought together, “marching for unity” (ibid).  In the case of both Latvia and 
Estonia, cooperation amongst nationalists is of particular importance with regard 
to the Russian-speaking population. 
 
 
EKRE and Russian-speakers in Estonia  
In neighbouring Latvia, there is strong evidence that the Latvian and Russian 
community have found a common ground on the refugee crisis. Namely, that they 
may not be the closest, but that they have a mutual distrust of asylum– seekers 
(Ragozin, 2015). Muravska (2015) and Ragozin (2015) allude to the fact that 
politicians in Latvia and more than half of the population are opposed to taking in 
refugees. Ragozin (2015) goes so far as to say that the two groups in Latvia are 
“united” on the issue (Ragozin 2015). Kott (2016) has also found that nationalist 
leaning ethnic Latvians and Russians in Latvia have found a common ground in 
the discourse of ‘endangered whiteness’ stemming from even the idea that people 
of a foreign background might come to Latvia. According to Latvian Foreign 
Minister Edgars Rinkevics, Latvia has the most negative attitude towards refugees 
in the European Union (Muravska 2015). What is telling is that in Latvia, Harmony, 
the political party which caters to Russian speakers, helped nationalists to push a 
law which would stop the government from accepting more refugees without 
first putting the issue to a vote in parliament (Ragozin 2015). 
Whereas their Latvian counterparts, the National Alliance is part of a three-party 
coalition, EKRE was elected to the Estonian Parliament for the first time in March 
of 2015 and is not in government. As a nationalist party, the question of whom 
they define as Estonian might change with the arrival, or the potential arrival, of a 
number of others outside of the traditional ethnic make-up of Estonia. Although 
Estonia has taken a very small number of refugees, it should be noted that the 
concern over refugees is not necessarily about the numbers that have been 
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accepted, but the potential for a massive influx of foreigners into Estonian society. 
This is what EKRE has successfully capitalised on in the past two years.  
It has been stated in several interviews that many Russian-speakers are more 
against Estonia taking refugees than Estonians.35 Centre Party MEP, Yana Toom, 
noted that the refugee crisis is the main issue that unites Estonians and Russian-
speakers in Estonia.36 Yana Toom also mentioned that there were some former 
Centre Party supporters who had shifted their support to EKRE.37 The Estonian 
Centre Party recently replaced its long-time, controversial leader, former-Mayor of 
Tallinn, Edgar Savisaar, after an internal power struggle. The new leader, Jüri 
Ratas, was elected as Centre party leader on 5 November 2016. Just weeks later, 
on 23 November, the Centre Party entered government with Ratas as Prime 
Minister after the Reform Party lost a vote of no confidence. Less than one month 
prior, in an interview with the author, Yana Toom predicted that Jüri Ratas would 
likely replace Savisaar as head of the Centre Party and was unsure if “the majority 
of Russian-speakers would like this.”38 Yana Toom also felt that there would be 
more Russian-speakers who would switch their allegiance to EKRE in the future.39 
Centre Party Member of Parliament, Oudekki Loone, did not share this view. She 
stressed that as long as EKRE stuck with the argument that Estonia should be an 
ethnic state, they would not get enough of the Russian vote.40 However, according 
to Loone, if they dropped this, the Centre Party would be in a dangerous position.41  
EKRE is not opposed to Russian-speaking members joining the party. In fact, 
there has never been any principle that all party members should be ethnic 
Estonians, rather, one must simply be an Estonian citizen.42 There has been an 
increasing number of Russian-speakers who have become friendly to Estonian 
nationalism and who are opposed to any new migration and some who have 
become members, largely due to the refugee crisis.43 This is more pronounced in 
                                                                                                                                       
35  Interview with Yana Toom; Interview with Martin Helme; Interview with Urmas Paet; Interview 
with Valdo Randpere; Interview with Jaak Madison.  
36  Interview with Yana Toom.  
37  Ibid.  
38  Ibid. 
39  Ibid. 
40  Interview with Oudekki Loone.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Interview with Ruuben Kaalep and Interview with Jaak Madison.  
43  Interview with Ruuben Kaalep. 
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Blue Awakening. Jaak Madison even stated that one member of Blue Awakening 
who was born in the Russian Federation and moved to Estonia when she was ten 
years old, is one of the “biggest patriots.”44 All of the interviews conducted with 
members of EKRE and with politicians from other political parties in Estonia 
acknowledged the potential for EKRE to attract more Russian-speakers on the 
basis of that portion of Estonian society holding slightly more conservative values, 
as well as being more sceptical of Estonia accepting migrants.45  
During a speech at the annual American Renaissance conference, Ruuben 
Kaalep was asked a question by a Polish nationalist as to whether or not EKRE 
attempted to reach out to the Russian population in Estonia. His answer was that 
“whenever two white nations together face something that is not white, they will 
see that eventually it is better to work together” (American Renaissance, 2016)46. 
The question to what extent is EKRE an ethnic, as opposed to strictly an Estonian 
nationalist party and would they be accepting of Russian-speaking Estonians as 
members can be answered based on interviews with several key EKRE members. 
The conclusion is reached that EKRE is an Estonian nationalist party and would 
accept Russian-speakers as members provided that they speak Estonian and 
present themselves as Estonian nationalists. The party would accept this type of 
Estonian nationalist, with a Russian background, but will not change their campaign 
literature to the Russian language.47  
Interestingly, there are plans to campaign in areas of Tallinn with large numbers 
of Russian-speaking residents.48 According to Jaak Madison, the party plans on 
approaching Russian-speakers, not as Russian-speakers, but as people who support 
traditional, conservative values and who would be receptive to a party that vows 
to protect Estonia in light of the migrant crisis.49 Madison further noted that EKRE 
will not campaign in these areas in Russian, but that they will send Russian-
speaking members to campaign for EKRE because “if these people are Alexi or 
                                                                                                                                       
44  Interview with Jaak Madisson.   
45  Interview with Oudekki Loone. Interview with Jaak Madisson; Interview with Valdo Randpere; 
Interview with Yana Toom; Interview with Kert Urmas Raudvere and Interview with Urmas Paet.   
46  American Renaissance: Ruuben Kaalep: A call to action from a small white country.” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIRue1635YA&t=304s  
47  Interview with Ruuben Kaalep and Interview with Jaak Madison 
48  Interview with Jaak Madison. The Russian-speaking population of Tallinn is near 40% of the city’s 
overall population.  
49  Interview with Jaak Madison.  
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Natalia and a member of EKRE, then they are not fascists.”50 Thus the party is an 
ethnic nationalist party that wishes to conserve the ethnic makeup of Estonia, but 
would consider Russian-speaking Estonians who speak Estonian and pledge their 
allegiance to Estonia as allies in light of the refugee crisis. The line in the sand 
EKRE has drawn with the country’s minority group becomes linguistic with this 
political development.  
While MPs from other parties are certainly aware of the rise in support for 
EKRE, many feel that this will not drastically alter the political landscape of Estonia. 
According to Reform Party MP, Valdo Randpere, although the migrant crisis was 
an area of great concern in Estonia in the beginning, things had calmed down 
and people were not as alarmed once they realised that Estonia would accept 
only a modest number of refugees.51 Regardless, EKRE, according to Randpere, 
“still wants to ride this horse…which is maybe not dead, but quite tired.”52 Reform 
Party MEP, Urmas Paet, elaborates further on this issue, pointing out that the issue 
of refugees has been on the political agenda for two years and not much has 
happened.53 According to Paet, EKRE will have a limited amount of time to play 
on fears about refugees and migrants arriving in Estonia, if they do not come in 
large numbers, EKRE will need some other elements in their agenda.54 Therefore, 
although the party has attracted some Russian-speaking members, and is willing 
to cooperate with other European nationalists, they have not sought them out 
and the refugee crisis alone might not be enough to attract Russian-speakers in 
large enough numbers to drastically impact the Estonian political landscape.  
 
 
CONCLUSION  
EKRE presents a unique case within the PRR party family as they are not in the 
position to be overly critical of the EU and NATO, like the majority of other PRR 
parties in Europe, due to their close proximity to and historic relationship with the 
Russian Federation. However, this rhetoric is increasing in the aftermath of the 
                                                                                                                                       
50  Ibid.  
51  Interview with Valdo Randpere.  
52 Ibid. 
53  Interview with Urmas Paet.  
54  Ibid.  
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2015 migrant crisis in Europe. Further, the fact that the largest minority group to 
which they have previously identified themselves against is white and historically 
Christian, makes them a suitable ally in light of the migrant crisis and the ideology 
of ethnofuturism reinforces this position. It remains to be seen exactly where 
Russian Estonians fit with EKRE vis-à-vis the ethnofuturism discourse. As this 
project stresses cooperation between ‘white’ nations in a time where they are seen 
to be facing a mutual threat, but also suggests that cooperation should not cease 
once the goals of this project are met, this presents an interesting future 
discourse between the two groups. EKRE mandates that Russian-speaking 
members present themselves as Estonian nationalists and affirms that the party 
will not campaign or converse in Russian. This suggests that language is the 
decisive factor, not ethnicity.  
EKRE does not advocate for Estonia to leave the EU, rather, they present an 
alternative vision for European cooperation which is more nationalistic, more 
conservative, and focused around Eastern Europe. They are not one of the 
numerous PRR parties who have a flirtatious or cozy relationship with Vladimir 
Putin and rather serve as a counterbalance within the realm of PRR politics to the 
Kremlin’s influence on this party family. There have been some Russian-speakers 
who have joined EKRE as a direct result of the refugee crisis. However, the 
number is not staggering and is not enough to drastically alter the political 
landscape of Estonia yet, though this is a new and unlikely alliance. This is in large 
part because the number of refugees that have come to Estonia has been quite 
modest and will, in all likelihood, continue to be. Given that Blue Awakening is 
heavily promoting the concept of ethnofuturism and intermarium, it seems likely 
that EKRE will continue to be open to Russian-speakers who adapt to EKRE’s 
stipulations for membership, though as of yet, they have not sought them out. To 
answer the research questions, in the case of EKRE, it appears that the possibility 
of the influx of a foreign, racially and religiously different ‘other’ has begun to 
change the dynamics of the relationship between a PRR party, EKRE, and the 
Russian-speaking population in Estonia. However, it remains to be seen whether a 
significant amount of Russian-speakers will gravitate to EKRE and if having more 
Russian-speaking members in the party will attract others.  
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